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PROXIMATE CAUSE UNTANGLED 
MARK A. GEISTFELD* 
ABSTRACT 
The many facets of tort liability are filtered through the requirement of 
proximate cause, which has made the element confusing and the source of 
considerable controversy.  Is proximate cause properly determined by the 
directness test or the foreseeability test, each of which has been both widely 
adopted and roundly criticized?  Is there any defensible conception of a 
direct cause?  Is foreseeability an adequately determinate method for 
limiting liability?  If so, is foreseeability relevant to duty, to proximate 
cause, or to both elements?  Disagreement about all these matters stems 
from the failure to fully untangle the role of proximate cause across all 
elements of the tort claim. 
In a negligence case, for example, duty determines the risks that factor 
into the duty to exercise reasonable care.  This property implies that the 
duty must be limited to the risks of foreseeable harm in order for the 
standard of reasonable care to govern only those harms.  Foreseeability for 
this purpose is defined by the general zones of danger or reference classes 
that the reasonable person would consider when estimating the likelihood 
of accidental harm, reducing foreseeability to a behavioral concept that is 
adequately determinate for resolving the issue of breach.  The element of 
proximate cause then provides a case-specific requirement that the 
plaintiff’s injury must be within a general category of foreseeable harms 
encompassed by both the tort duty and its breach—a necessary predicate 
for liability.  The prima facie case accordingly requires the foreseeability 
test to establish proximate cause for the breach of a duty that is limited to 
the risks of foreseeable harm. 
Once liability has been established, the damages phase of the case 
requires a further inquiry to fix the full extent of compensable harm 
proximately caused by the tortious conduct.  The foreseeability test 
produces inequities in the determination of damages that the directness test 
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fairly resolves.  This inquiry is structured by the uniformly adopted rule that 
permits full recovery for an unforeseeably large harm, such as a crushed 
skull, that was directly caused by a tortious force that would normally 
cause minor injury, such as a bump on the head. This rationale also 
explains why the intentional torts exclusively rely on the directness test, 
eliminating culpability as a confounding factor in the analysis of proximate 
cause. Instead of being competing formulations, the directness and 
foreseeability tests each address different components of a tort claim, 
explaining why each one is both widely adopted and yet roundly criticized 
when employed as the only method for determining proximate cause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Like any other form of behavior, tortious conduct can have 
repercussions extending far into the future.  Due to the ongoing ripple 
effects of factual causation, courts have adopted further causal restrictions 
on the scope of liability: Unless the plaintiff’s injury was proximately 
caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct, the plaintiff cannot recover.1 
Courts have disagreed about the policy rationales for this limitation of 
liability.  “There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has 
 
 1. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (5th ed. 
1984) (“In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes 
of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. . . . As a practical matter, legal 
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and 
of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability.”).  
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called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a 
welter of confusion.”2 
The difficulty originated within the medieval writ system, which relied 
on causal concepts to define the appropriate writ for the legal actions that 
now form the core of modern tort law.3  After the writ system was abolished 
in the mid-nineteenth century, courts used the language of proximate cause 
to limit liability for policy reasons unrelated to relationships of cause and 
effect.  “The result has been a widely recognized confusion, and as 
luxuriant a crop of legal literature as is to be had in any branch of tort law.”4  
Today, the noncausal policy issues that justify categorical limitations 
of liability are addressed by the element of duty.  This refinement of 
proximate cause, however, has only made a “little headway . . . in dispelling 
the confusion and taking some of the workload off this weary concept.”5  
The disarray in the case law and associated commentary led the U.S. 
Supreme Court to observe, “[t]he best use that can be made of the 
authorities on proximate cause is merely to furnish illustrations of situations 
which judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged to be on one 
side of the line or the other.”6 
The element of proximate cause in negligence and other tort cases is 
confusing largely because courts evaluate the issue in two ways.  One 
approach defines proximate cause in terms of the risks foreseeably created 
by the defendant at the time of the tortious conduct, a forward-looking 
inquiry fundamentally different from the alternative that asks whether the 
plaintiff’s injury can be directly traced back to the defendant’s tortious 
conduct.7  The two tests reach different outcomes for direct, unforeseeable 
harms, with commentators disagreeing about which one represents the 
 
 2. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 45, at 311 (1st ed.1941).  See 
also, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the 
Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 49–50 (1991) (“Modern tort theorists have lavished 
seemingly boundless attention on the problem of explaining proximate cause, but the consensus of 
law students and others is that proximate cause remains a hopeless riddle.”). 
 3. See S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 316–52 (1969) 
(tracing the development of modern tort law from the writ of trespass, which applied to directly 
caused harms, and from the writ of trespass on the case, which applied to indirectly caused 
harms).  
 4. FOWLING V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR.  & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES & GRAY 
ON TORTS § 20.1 (3d. ed. 2006-2007 & 2020 update) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON 
TORTS]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 839 (1996) (quoting 1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS 
OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110 (1906)). 
 7. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 274, 280–96.  
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majority rule.8  Each test has widespread support in the case law: 
“Foreseeability does play a large part in limiting liability. . . . On the other 
hand, there may be liability for unforeseeable consequences” under the 
directness test.9  Consistent with this case law, the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts effectively recognizes both tests for proximate cause without 
reconciling their differences.   
Concluding that “the term ‘proximate cause’ is a poor one to describe 
limits on the scope of liability,” the Restatement (Third) instead limits 
liability “to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s 
conduct tortious.”10  This risk standard, “[w]hen properly understood and 
framed,” is “congruent with” the foreseeability standard that has been 
adopted by “virtually all jurisdictions . . . for some range of scope-of-
liability issues in negligence cases.”11 
The risk standard would seem to rule out the direct-consequences test, 
which permits recovery for directly caused “harm that is beyond the scope 
of the risk in negligence actions, including harm that is unforeseeable.”12  
Nevertheless, the Restatement (Third) recognizes that “[i]f the type of harm 
that occurs is within the scope of the [tortious] risk,” then “the fact that the 
actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of harm caused by 
the tortious conduct does not affect the actor’s liability for the harm.”13  The 
causal rule in these cases conforms to the directness test.14  Consequently, 
the Restatement (Third) concedes that the rule is “difficult to reconcile” 
with the foreseeability test embodied in the risk standard.15  The 
Restatement (Third) nevertheless justifies this application of the directness 
test on the grounds that such cases “rarely arise” and it is 
“administrative[ly] convenien[t]” to avoid “the sometimes uncertain and 
 
 8. Compare DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 
203 (2d ed. 2011 & 2020 update) (“It is very doubtful that liability unlimited by foreseeability has 
much contemporary support.”), with RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 271–72 (1999) (concluding that 
the “foresight limitation has not met with a generally favorable response in American courts,” 
whereas “a majority of states use the directness test”). 
 9. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, at § 20.5. 
 10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 
29 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 11. Id. cmt. e. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. cmt. p. 
 14. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964) (“The weight of 
authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to consequences foreseeable at the time 
of the negligent conduct when the consequences are ‘direct,’ and the damage, although other and 
greater than expectable, is of the same general sort that was risked.”). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 cmt. p (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
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indeterminate inquiry into whether the extent of the harm was 
unforeseeable.”16 
These varied rules and their rationales are puzzling, resting on 
distinctions like direct causes and foreseeable harms that do not obviously 
clarify matters.  As I will argue, the confusion surrounding proximate cause 
can be eliminated by clearly identifying the different roles the inquiry and 
its concepts play within a tort claim.   
Proximate cause serves two different purposes in any tort claim.  In 
addition to establishing liability in the first instance, proximate cause also 
applies to the damages phase of the case—the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
damages only for the compensable harms proximately caused by the 
tortious conduct.  Unlike the liability phase of the case, causal questions for 
determining the extent of damages turn on a different set of normative 
considerations.  This difference in the two causal inquiries justifies the two 
tests for proximate cause, with each one addressing different elements of 
the tort claim.  The foreseeability and directness tests are each valid within 
their appropriate domains, which is why the long-running debate about the 
single best test has been inconclusive.  
The argument proceeds in three parts.  Part I further describes how the 
development of proximate cause has produced two apparently incompatible 
tests that have not been adequately reconciled.  Part II explains why the 
foreseeability test necessarily governs the prima facie case, even within 
jurisdictions that purportedly use the directness test.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the analysis addresses an ongoing controversy involving the 
role of foreseeability across the elements, demonstrating why proximate 
cause can provide a case-specific limitation of liability to foreseeable harms 
only if the tort duty is categorically limited to foreseeable harms.  
Foreseeability for this purpose is a behavioral conception defined by the 
risks contemplated by the reasonable person when making the safety 
decision in question, an inquiry that is adequately structured for resolution 
by the jury.  Part III then shows why the directness test is the appropriate 
method for determining proximate cause in the damages phase of the case, 
even within jurisdictions that purportedly use the foreseeability test.  This 
rationale also explains why the rule of proximate cause for the intentional 
torts differs from the rules governing accidental harms, eliminating 
culpability as a potentially confounding factor in the analysis of proximate 
cause.  The appropriate formulation of proximate cause only becomes 
evident once the interrelationships between that inquiry and other elements 
of the tort claim have been fully untangled. 
 
 16. Id. 
  
2021] PROXIMATE CAUSE UNTANGLED 425 
 
I. ONE ELEMENT, MULTIPLE ISSUES 
Throughout the history of proximate cause, courts have used the 
element to resolve a multitude of issues.  “Having no integrated meaning of 
its own, [the] chameleon quality [of proximate cause] permits it to be 
substituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision 
on that element becomes difficult. . . . No other formula . . . so nearly does 
the work of Aladdin’s lamp.”17  To fully understand proximate cause, we 
must first understand the various issues that the element has addressed. 
A. Untangling Duty from Proximate Cause 
The abolition of the writ system in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century was intended to be no more than a procedural innovation.  Freed 
from the formalistic pleading requirements of that system, courts were 
supposed to rely on the substantive bases of liability that had been implicit 
in the various writs.18  During this period, torts emerged as one of the 
recognized substantive fields of law.  “The first American treatise on Torts 
appeared in 1859; Torts was first taught as a separate law school subject in 
1870; the first Torts casebook was published in 1874.”19 
The development of torts as a substantive field of the common law 
centered on the negligence cause of action.  Courts and commentators of 
this era recognized that disparate legal actions within the writ system could 
be unified by the concept of a legal duty to exercise reasonable care.20  “The 
growth of negligence from the omission of a preexisting, specific duty 
owed to a limited class of persons to the violation of a generalized standard 
of care owed to all ensured the emergence of Torts as an independent 
branch of law.”21 
The meaning of a generalized standard of care, however, required 
further elaboration.  Is the standard generalized in the sense that it involves 
a duty universally owed to the entire world, in which case anyone injured 
by a breach of the duty can potentially recover?  Or is the standard of care 
 
 17. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72 
(1950). 
 18. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001) 
(explaining how courts formulated the substantive fields of the common law following abolition 
of the writ system).  
 19. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (1980) 
(citations omitted). 
 20. See id. at 301–08 (identifying duty as the first element to appear in the historical 
development of modern negligence law, largely because the “concept of duty provided an 
analytical and linguistic framework for reconciling the cases”). 
 21. Id. at 18. 
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instead only defined in a generalized or abstract manner, so that when 
applied to the facts of a specific case it crystallizes into a concrete tort duty 
limited to those individuals foreseeably threatened by the risky behavior in 
question?  Each conception had ample support in the case law and 
commentary when the court confronted the issue in the landmark case 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.22 
In his famous dissenting opinion, Judge Andrews defined the tort duty 
as a universal obligation “imposed on each one of us to protect society from 
unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone.”23  A universal duty 
would permit anyone who was injured by a breach of the duty to recover, a 
potentially limitless form of liability given the never-ending factual 
consequences that can flow from any form of behavior.  Recognizing that 
some limitation of liability is warranted, Judge Andrews argued that courts 
can limit the scope of proximate cause for reasons of public policy: 
What we do mean by the word “proximate” is that, because of 
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law 
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain 
point.  This is not logic.  It is practical politics.  Take our rule as 
to fires.  Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire my house 
and my neighbor’s.  I may recover from a negligent railroad[.]  
He may not.  Yet the wrongful act as directly harmed the one as 
the other.  We may regret that the line was drawn just where it 
was, but drawn somewhere it had to be.  We said the act of the 
railroad was not the proximate cause of our neighbor’s fire.  
Cause it surely was.  The words we used were simply indicative 
of our notions of public policy.24 
Judge Andrews could have bolstered this argument with a variety of 
other rules.  For example, the common law had long denied recovery for 
stand-alone emotional harms and pure economic losses on the ground that 
such harms were too “remote” and therefore not proximately caused by the 
defendant’s negligence.25  The rationale for doing so was based on policy 
reasons, not causal reasons—a formulation of proximate cause that is 
 
 22. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 23. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 103–04. 
 25. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence 
Without Impact, 50 AM. L. REG. 141, 146 (1902) (stating that the first “principal” reason for 
denying recovery for stand-alone emotional harms is that “it is too remote” and then criticizing 
this ground for the denial of recovery).  Courts adopted this same rationale to limit recovery for 
pure economic loss.  See, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 170 n.50 (5th ed. 1977) 
(“The principled denial of liability for economic loss used to be put on grounds of remoteness” 
under the English common law”). 
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currently employed by civilian jurisdictions in Europe.26  As these rules 
illustrate, courts can infuse the element of proximate cause with the type of 
policy-based reasons discussed by Judge Andrews in order to categorically 
limit liability under a duty of care universally owed to everyone in the 
world.  
Palsgraf is a pivotal case because the majority opinion, written by 
Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo, rejected the universal duty.  The rationale 
for limiting duty to the risks of foreseeable harm had already been 
forcefully articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who also maintained that 
the duty of reasonable care is universally owed to the entire world.27  But as 
Cardozo recognized in Palsgraf, the requirement of foreseeability limits the 
duty to those who are foreseeably threatened by the risky conduct, and so a 
plaintiff can recover only by showing that the defendant’s breach of duty 
constitutes “‘a wrong’ to herself; i.e., a violation of her own right, and not 
merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct ‘wrongful’ because 
unsocial.”28  The breach of a duty universally owed to the entire world is 
“unsocial,” but courts in the vast majority of states now follow Palsgraf and 
require the defendant to breach a relational duty owed to a plaintiff who 
was foreseeably injured by the defendant’s tortious conduct.29 
 
 26. See 2 CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS 487 (2000) 
(observing that in cases of “pure economic loss . . . the courts’ willingness to reject claims for 
want of causation is at its greatest all over Europe”); id. at 169 (explaining that the “legal 
problem” of whether non-economic damage is recoverable in Europe depends on “questions of 
attributability, particularly in the field of causality”); Jaap Spier & Olav A. Haazen, Comparative 
Conclusions on Causation, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION 127, 133–37 (Jaap Spier 
ed., 2000); see also EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, Principles of European Tort Law, in 
RESEARCH UNIT FOR EUROPEAN TORT LAW, EUROPEAN CENTRE OF TORT AND INSURANCE LAW, 
UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: FAULT 369, 372 (Pierre Widmer ed., 2005) (listing the elements 
required for negligence liability without mentioning duty).  
 27. Compare OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 95 (1881) (“The 
requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should have made a choice.  But the 
only possible purpose of introducing this moral element is to make the power of avoiding the evil 
complained of a condition of liability.  There is no such power where the evil cannot be 
foreseen.”), with Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 660–63 (1873) 
(discussing tort liabilities in terms of “duties of all the world to all the world” while recognizing 
limited exceptions, like assault, that “cannot satisfactorily be resolved into duties of all to all, but 
they are discerned to tend in the same direction”). 
 28. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.  
 29. See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in Microcosm, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1890–92 (2011) (“When faced with the issue, thirty-three (of fifty-one) 
courts hold with fair consistency that whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim is a question 
to be decided in the duty context.  Only four jurisdictions clearly follow Judge Andrews in holding 
that plaintiff-foreseeability is properly and solely a matter for proximate cause.”).  Of course, 
much turns on how one interprets the requirement of foreseeability.  Compare id. at 1893 
(concluding that “[i]n the remaining fourteen jurisdictions, the proper doctrinal home for plaintiff-
foreseeability remains unclear,” in part because “courts conceptualize Palsgraf-like scenarios in 
terms of harm-foreseeability rather than plaintiff-foreseeability”), with DOBBS ET AL., supra note 
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This relational duty of reasonable care does not revert the legal 
obligation back to the crabbed, narrowly defined relations of status and the 
like required by the writ system; it is a general standard of conduct 
potentially owed to anyone at any time, depending on the risky conduct in 
question.  For example, as you drive up the street, the other drivers, 
pedestrians, and nearby property owners to whom you owe a duty are 
continually changing.  When you get out of the car and engage in some 
other type of risky behavior, the categories of foreseeable victims change 
again.  The tort duty can govern any form of affirmative conduct creating a 
risk of foreseeable harm to others even though “the identity of the harmed 
person or harmed interest is unknown,” and so in this essential respect 
“everyone has a duty of care to the whole world.”30 
Because the relational duty is limited by the policy reasons that justify 
the requirement of foreseeability, courts can rely on other substantively 
compatible policy reasons to place further limits on the duty.31  As the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts explains, “in some categories of cases, reasons 
of principle or policy dictate that liability should not be imposed.  In these 
cases, courts use the rubric of duty to apply general categorical rules 
withholding liability.”32  Limiting the scope of duty for reasons of principle 
or policy is perhaps the most important legacy of Palsgraf, yet this aspect 
of the case is ignored by the ongoing debate over its specification of 
relational duties.33   
 
8, § 202 (“The great majority of cases hold negligent defendants liable only for harm of the same 
general kind that they should have reasonably foreseen and should have acted to avoid.  The same 
principle holds defendants liable only to plaintiffs who are in the same general class of people 
who were at risk from his negligence.”) (footnote omitted).  The ambiguity is further enhanced by 
cases in which courts limit duty without expressly mentioning foreseeability.  See, e.g., Dep’t of 
Lab. v. McConnell, 828 S.E.2d 352, 358 (Ga. 2019) (disapproving the holding in a prior case “to 
the extent that it created a general legal duty ‘to all the world not to subject [others] to an 
unreasonable risk of harm’” (quoting Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. 
1982) (alteration in original)).  
 30. Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Wis. 1998) (quoting Rockweit v. 
Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (discussing a defendant’s tort duty that is “established when it 
can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone”) 
(internal citations omitted)).  
 31. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Social Value as a Policy-Based Limitation of the 
Ordinary Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901 (2009) [hereinafter 
Geistfeld, Policy-Based Limitations of Duty] (explaining why duty can be limited by policy 
reasons relevant to the entire category of cases governed by the duty, not merely those policies 
implicated by the case at hand) . 
 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010).  
 33. “The elements of the debate are canonical: (1) What is the nature of duty—is it relational 
or act-centered? (2) Is plaintiff-foreseeability a duty inquiry or an aspect of proximate cause? and 
(3) Is court or jury the proper arbiter of foreseeability?” Cardi, supra note 29, at 1874. The 
limitation of duty for reasons of principle or policy, however, has other significant implications. 
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By definition, a universal duty is unlimited within the class of 
individuals injured by the breach, leaving proximate cause as the only 
element capable of placing additional categorical limits on liability for 
policy reasons—the approach defended by Judge Andrews.  When used in 
this manner, proximate cause is confusing in part because it depends on 
policy considerations having little to do with “cause and effect” 
relationships.34  For example, a defendant who negligently killed someone 
undoubtedly caused foreseeable emotional distress to family members and 
friends.  By denying recovery for these stand-alone emotional harms on the 
ground that they were unforeseeably remote, courts imbued foreseeability 
with policy considerations unrelated to causality.  
Today, courts deny recovery for stand-alone emotional harms and pure 
economic losses on the ground that there is no duty with respect to such 
harms, not because the injuries are unforeseeable or too remote as a matter 
of proximate cause.35  This development of relational duties has reduced the 
role of proximate cause to a consideration of cause-and-effect relationships, 
thereby limiting the meaning of terms like foreseeability and remoteness to 
those causal concerns. 
This reduced role for proximate cause, however, has not fully solved 
the problem of vagueness.  In developing the more limited causal 
dimension of the inquiry, courts and commentators have disagreed about 
the appropriate conception, yielding different tests for determining 
proximate cause. 
B. Competing Conceptions of Proximate Cause 
Like the element of duty, the element of proximate cause fully 
emerged only after courts began to develop negligence as a substantive 
 
For example, it renders implausible the interpretation that tort liability is formulated to further the 
objective of allocative efficiency.  See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, 
Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 173–80 (2011) [hereinafter 
Geistfeld, Misalignment]. 
 34. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 39–40 (1927) (summarizing analysis of 
a wide range of cases in which courts limited liability for policy reasons not accurately described 
in terms of causation). 
 35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 
47 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2012) (observing that “in the area of emotional harm, a court may decide 
that an identified and articulated policy is weighty enough to require the withdrawal of liability” 
under a “no-duty ruling”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 
1(1) (AM. L. INST. 2020) (“An actor has no general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of 
economic loss on another”). 
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cause of action in the nineteenth century.36  However, “[t]he courts in these 
early proximate cause cases did not adopt a uniform test of proximate 
cause.”37 
At this time, the “developing substantive law of damages” had already 
recognized “a general principle . . . that only proximate consequential 
damages could be recovered, and not remote consequential damages.”38  
For example, the damages recoverable for breach of contract were limited 
by a requirement of proximate cause, and courts “borrowed heavily” from 
this and related “areas in applying proximate cause limitations in negligence 
actions.”39   The first torts treatise, published in 1860, cited “primarily to 
special damage cases” to support the proposition that proximate cause is a 
general limitation of tort liability.40 
The concept of proximate cause subsequently developed into a thicket 
of competing rationales and tests for liability.  “While the treatise writers 
were unanimous in recognizing the proximate cause limitation on 
negligence liability, they presented a diverse set of justifications for the 
rule.”41  The justifications were not limited to damage questions but also 
encompassed the imposition of liability in the first instance.42  And although 
courts were all purportedly applying the same rule of proximate cause—
whether the plaintiff’s injury was a natural, ordinary consequence of the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct—the early case law revealed “two potentially 
divergent approaches” for resolving the issue.43  In some cases, courts 
focused on “the causal sequence” traced backwards from the injury to the 
defendant’s tortious conduct as per the directness test; in others, they 
applied a forward-looking inquiry that “emphasized the expected, 
foreseeable consequences of defendant’s conduct as the test of proximate 
causation.”44 
 
 36. Kelley, supra note 2, at 68 (“It was only in the 1840s, when a more coherent idea of a 
substantive law of negligent torts had developed, that proximate cause became firmly established 
as an element in negligence law.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 70 & n.90. 
 39. Id. at 70–71, 70 n.91 (observing also that courts at this time relied on proximate cause to 
determine the scope of coverage under maritime insurance policies). 
 40. Id. at 72 (discussing C.G. ADDISON, WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES, BEING A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 4–5 (1860)). 
 41. Id. at 73. 
 42. For example, Frederick Pollock justified proximate cause as a limitation of the 
defendant’s liability to the foreseeable risks of harm created by the breach of duty. FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 21–45 (1887).  Pollock, in turn, was influenced by the views of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who argued that foreseeable harm is “the touchstone of liability in tort in 
general and negligence in particular.”  Kelley, supra note 2, at 80. 
 43. Kelley, supra note 2, at 74. 
 44. Id. at 75. 
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In negligence cases, the foreseeability test is easily justified: The duty 
to exercise reasonable care is limited to the risks of foreseeable harm, so a 
negligent defendant’s liability should be limited to those foreseeable harms 
caused by the risks that rendered the conduct unreasonably dangerous.45  
For this same reason, however, the foreseeability test can be criticized: “It is 
also clear that if this analysis of the duty problem is accepted, no good, but 
only confusion, can result from repeating the same inquiries as to 
foreseeability under the cause issue as were asked and answered (or should 
have been) under the duty issue.”46  
Another problem with the test is that the concept of foreseeability can 
be unduly indeterminate. As the California Supreme Court memorably put 
it, “there are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and 
thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a 
socially and judicially acceptable limit on recovery.”47 
The foreseeability test is further undermined by “the great weight of 
authority in this country” that applies the directness test 
where the defendant has been negligent toward the plaintiff or his 
property (even under the restrictive [foreseeability] view of the 
scope of duty) and where injury has come through the very 
hazard that made the conduct negligent, but where because the 
stage is set for it the extent of the injury passes all bounds of 
reasonable anticipation.  A milk deliverer, for instance, 
negligently leaves a bottle with a chipped lip, and this scratches a 
housewife’s hand as she takes it in.  All this is easily within the 
range of foresight.  This particular housewife, however, has a 
blood condition so that what to most women would be a trivial 
scratch leads to blood poisoning and death. . . .  In these and like 
cases of what well may be called direct consequences, the courts 
generally hold the defendant liable for the full extent of the injury 
without regard to foreseeability.48 
The directness test can be traced back to the writ system.  The writ of 
trespass let the plaintiff recover for physical harms directly caused by the 
defendant, whereas the writ of trespass on the case provided recovery for 
physical harms indirectly caused by the defendant based on the specific 
circumstances of the case.49  The combined logic of the two writs suggests 
 
 45. See, e.g., Joseph Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning “Legal Cause” at Common 
Law, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 35 (1909) (“Why should a defendant be responsible for occurrences 
entirely extraneous to the purposes of his duty?  To hold him responsible would be . . . an arbitrary 
penalty beyond compensation for his wrong in the form of involuntary insurance.”). 
 46. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 20.5. 
 47. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989). 
 48. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 20.5. 
 49. See MILSOM, supra note 3, at 316–52. 
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that a defendant is liable for all physical harms directly caused by the 
tortious misconduct, and can also incur liability for having indirectly caused 
harms in specific circumstances, most notably, when the defendant could 
reasonably anticipate or foresee that such harms would occur.  A direct 
cause is always proximate, and an indirect cause is proximate only when it 
foreseeably brings about the harm—the formulation embodied in the 
directness test. 
For purposes of this inquiry, an injury is not directly caused by the 
defendant’s tortious behavior when a force intervenes between the 
misconduct and the ensuing harm: 
By and large external forces will be regarded as intervening if 
they appear on the scene after the defendant had acted unless 
perhaps their pending inevitability at the time of the defendant’s 
negligent act or omission is made crystal clear.  And when a new 
force (for which the defendant is not responsible) “intervenes” in 
this crude sense to bring about a result that the defendant’s 
negligence would not otherwise have produced, the defendant is 
generally held [liable] for that result only where the intervening 
force was foreseeable.  As many cases put it, a new and 
unforeseeable force breaks the causal chain.50 
An unforeseeable intervening force is a superseding cause that “breaks 
the causal chain” between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s 
harm, thereby making the negligence a remote cause not subject to 
liability.51  If, for example, the defendant negligently started a fire that 
smoldered for a few days and was then spread to the plaintiff’s property by 
unforeseeably high winds accompanying a storm, the timing of the storm 
determines proximate cause.  If the storm occurred after the fire was 
negligently started, the unforeseeable wind is a new causal force that 
supersedes the defendant’s prior negligent conduct and cuts off liability for 
the ensuing harms.  But if that same unforeseeable storm had already been 
approaching when the defendant first set the fire, it would not have 
intervened following the negligence, making the fire a direct, proximate 
cause of the ensuing damage.  The timing of a causal force determines 
whether it intervenes between the defendant’s negligence and the 
occurrence of injury, and an intervening force must be foreseeable for the 
negligence to be a proximate cause. 
This example also shows why so many courts and commentators reject 
the directness test.  The storm would be an intervening cause only if its 
force came into existence after the negligent conduct.  How can the court 
 
 50. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 20.5. 
 51. Id. n.35. 
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make such a determination?  As chaos theory shows, the movement of a 
butterfly in Africa can set in motion forces that ultimately cause a hurricane 
to cross the Atlantic Ocean.  The “force” of such a storm can be in place 
long before the negligent defendant’s conduct occurred, even if the storm 
apparently entered the scene after the defendant had acted negligently.  The 
timing of the causal forces is all that matters for distinguishing between 
direct and intervening causes, yet there is no good way to determine reliably 
when a force was initiated.  Why not when the earth was first formed?  
None of these questions have any apparent connection to the underlying 
policy issue about the appropriate scope of the defendant’s liability, a 
severe problem for the directness test. 
The apparently intractable problem of conceptualizing a direct cause 
explains the appeal of the foreseeability test, which is based on the rationale 
for liability in the first instance.  That test, however, suffers from the 
problems described above.  “And so we go round and round, locked in a 
relentless rivalry” between these two competing conceptions of proximate 
cause.52 
C. Untangling Proximate Cause Across the Elements 
To establish the prima facie case of liability, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant breached a tort duty that proximately caused some 
compensable harm—an inquiry that aligns the elements of duty, breach, and 
factual causation with the element of damages.53  Because all of the other 
elements are filtered through proximate cause, the policy issues more 
appropriately addressed by any one of them can instead be shunted to 
proximate cause, creating confusion of the type that has long plagued the 
relation between duty and proximate cause.  The core meaning of proximate 
cause—its distinctive contribution to a tort claim—can be uncovered only if 
the inquiry is untangled from all other elements of the tort claim.  
This conclusion is fully illustrated by the relation between proximate 
cause and the determination of damages—the last step in the tort inquiry.  
Having established an entitlement to damages for at least some 
compensable harm in the prima facie case, the plaintiff must then prove the 
quantum of damages or amount of compensable harm caused by the 
tortious conduct.  For example, “[t]he injured plaintiff is entitled to recover 
reasonable medical and other expenses proximately resulting from tortious 
 
 52. Kelley, supra note 2, at 105. 
 53. See Geistfeld, Misalignment, supra note 33, at 148–57 (showing how the element of 
proximate cause renders negligence liability internally coherent by aligning the elements from 
duty to damages within the prima facie case).  
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injury and expenses that will probably result in the future.”54  Similarly, 
“[t]he plaintiff is entitled to recover for all forms of suffering proximately 
caused by tortious injury, including future suffering.”55  Unless damages are 
limited by proximate cause, the defendant’s liability for a tortious injury 
would extend to all future harms factually caused by that predicate injury, a 
sum that can continually expand due to the ongoing factual consequences 
produced by any given condition.56  As is true for the liability phase of the 
case, the damages phase of the case must also rely on proximate cause to 
limit the scope of the defendant’s liability. 
In first developing the element of proximate cause, courts and 
commentators largely relied on damage rules to formulate a monolithic test 
of proximate cause governing all aspects of the tort claim.57  This approach 
rests on the unexamined premise that the policy reasons for limiting the 
scope of liability in the prima facie case are the same as those for limiting 
the scope of liability with respect to the determination of damages. Is this 
assumption valid?  Throughout the history of modern tort law, courts and 
scholars have not adequately addressed this question.  Doing so is necessary 
to understand how proximate cause properly applies in tort cases. 
II. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
Regardless of the label that a court applies to its test for proximate 
cause, the prima facie case of liability is inherently limited to the harms 
encompassed by the duty the defendant owes to the plaintiff.  This 
axiomatic limitation of liability unifies the directness and foreseeability 
tests within the liability phase of the case, while adequately structuring the 
inquiry in a manner that is well suited for resolution by the jury.  
A. A Reprise of Duty and Proximate Cause 
“It is fundamental that the existence of a legally cognizable duty is a 
prerequisite to all tort liability.”58  The element of duty determines the types 
of harms for which the defendant is responsible as a matter of tort law.  
 
 54. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 479. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining why proximate cause is required to 
limit liability for factually caused losses). 
 57. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 58. Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1993); see also, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett 
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (holding that “common-law damages actions of the sort 
raised by petitioner”—involving strict products liability, negligence, express warranty, and 
intentional tort claims—“are premised on the existence of a legal duty”). 
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Without an antecedent duty, there is no legal basis for subjecting a 
defendant to tort liability for the injury in question. 
In a negligence case, duty determines the risks of harm that factor into 
the standard of reasonable care.59  The standard of reasonable care then 
determines how a duty-bearer should behave in light of those potential 
harms.  As a functional matter, whether a defendant breached the duty to 
exercise reasonable care—the second element of negligence liability—must 
be determined by reference to the harms governed by that duty. 
Establishing duty, therefore, is the first element of negligence liability. 
The duty to exercise reasonable care is limited to the risks of 
foreseeable harm: “No actor can be counted as negligent unless he either 
actually foresaw, or a reasonable person in a similar position would have 
foreseen that harm to someone’s interests was an unreasonably likely 
outcome of his conduct.”60  Not all foreseeable harms, however, are 
encompassed by the duty.61  By defining duty exclusively in terms of 
certain types of foreseeable harms, tort law obligates the duty-bearer to 
consider only those harms when engaged in risky behavior.  Harms that fall 
outside of the duty are not within the actor’s legal obligation and cannot 
factor into the determination of whether the actor behaved in the legally 
required manner. 
The role of foreseeability within the element of duty, however, has 
created confusion about the appropriate test for proximate cause. 
Foreseeability limits duty, so why place further limits on liability for 
unforeseeable harms with a separate inquiry into proximate cause? 
Resolution of this issue depends on the different roles of foreseeability 
across the different elements of a tort claim.  Duty is defined by “relatively 
clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of 
cases.”62  Rules applicable to a general class of cases are questions of law 
decided by judges, including the rule that the duty to exercise reasonable 
care is limited to the risks of foreseeable harm for all negligence cases.  
Foreseeability in this respect is only a general limitation of liability that 
fundamentally differs from its case-specific application. 
 
 59. See Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of 
Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1923–28 (2002); see also MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT 
LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 161–72 (2008) (showing how different specifications of the duty result in 
different specifications of the risks governed by the standard of reasonable care). 
 60. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, § 179. 
 61. Id. (“[F]oreseeability of harm, though necessary, is not sufficient.”).  For example, 
foreseeable harms of pure economic loss and stand-alone emotional distress fall outside of the 
duty and are not compensable as a result.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
cmt. a. (AM. L. INST. 2010).  
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Individual cases turn on their particular facts, requiring case-by-case 
determinations of whether the plaintiff suffered a foreseeable harm that is 
within the general class of foreseeable harms governed by the duty.  The 
prima facie case of liability accordingly depends on a case-specific inquiry 
into foreseeability, explaining why “virtually all jurisdictions employ a 
foreseeability (or risk) standard for some range” of proximate cause 
issues.63 “Central to the limitation of liability . . . is the idea that an actor 
should be held liable only for harm that was among the potential harms—
the risks—that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”64  
Though easily justified in these terms, the rationale for the 
foreseeability test is even more fundamental.  Liability is inherently limited 
by the scope of the tort duty; one cannot incur liability for an injury without 
being legally responsible for it.  A duty limited to the risks of foreseeable 
harm necessarily absolves a defendant from responsibility—and thus 
liability—for any harm that is entirely unforeseeable. 
The distinctive roles of foreseeability within the elements of duty and 
proximate cause, however, has created yet another source of confusion.  
“[B]ecause the existence of a legal duty is a question of law,” some courts 
“have also treated the foreseeability of a particular injury as a question of 
law” to be decided by judges.65  By relying on the element of duty to make 
case-specific findings of foreseeability as a matter of law, judges conflate 
the categorical role of foreseeability with its case-specific application, 
thereby usurping the role of the jury.  Consequently, the Restatement 
(Third) “disapproves” of judicial no-duty rulings of foreseeability that 
depend on case-specific facts “to protect the traditional function of the jury 
as factfinder.”66  To address this problem, the Restatement (Third) 
eliminates foreseeability from duty and places case-specific issues of 
foreseeability within the element of proximate cause or scope of liability for 
determination by the jury.67 
This resolution of the problem, however, severs the requisite 
connection between duty and proximate cause.  According to the 
Restatement (Third), “an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”68  Because 
 
 63. Id. § 29 cmts. e, j. 
 64. Id. cmt. d. 
 65. A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 914–16 (Neb. 2010) 
(recognizing also that “[o]ur mistake was a common one”). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010).  
 67. Id. cmt. a (“When liability depends on factors specific to an individual case, the 
appropriate rubric is scope of liability.”). 
 68. Id. § 7(a). 
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this formulation of duty is not limited by the requirement of foreseeability, 
it “essentially gives rise to a presumed duty every time a plaintiff is 
[physically] injured by a defendant.”69  Such a duty to exercise reasonable 
care accordingly encompasses all physical harms—both foreseeable and 
unforeseeable—factually caused by the defendant’s negligent behavior.  
Lacking any limitation of liability for unforeseeable harms, the rationale for 
the foreseeability test is eliminated: it no longer can be justified by “the idea 
that an actor should be held liable only for harm that was among the 
potential harms—the risks—that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”70 
The logic behind conclusion can be more rigorously expressed by the 
standard of reasonable care famously articulated by Judge Hand: “if the 
probability [of injury] be called P; the injury, L, and the burden [of a 
precaution], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by 
P: i.e., whether B < PL.”71  Consider a defendant who negligently failed to 
take a precaution with a burden B1 that would have eliminated a risk of 
foreseeable physical harm PL1.  Suppose that the plaintiff was instead 
physically harmed by an unforeseeable risk PL2 that would also have been 
eliminated if the defendant had exercised reasonable care.  Even if the jury 
only relied on the foreseeable risk PL1 in deciding that the defendant acted 
negligently, B1 < PL1, that conclusion makes the unforeseeable risk PL2 
tortious as well. The duty to exercise reasonable care encompasses all risks 
within the duty that would be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care, 
so the finding of negligence implies B1 < PL1 + PL2.  Hence the 
unforeseeable harm caused by the risk PL2 is within “those harms that result 
from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious” as required by the 
Restatement (Third)’s formulation of proximate cause.72 The harms that the 
defendant improperly risked by behaving negligently necessarily include all 
harms within the duty that would have been eliminated by the exercise of 
reasonable care, permitting the plaintiff to recover for the unforeseeable 
injury. 
Proximate cause limits liability to foreseeable harms only if the duty is 
also limited to foreseeable harms.  In attempting to prevent judges from 
usurping the jury’s role in resolving case-specific issues of foreseeability, 
the Restatement (Third) goes too far by removing foreseeability from the 
specification of duty.  
 
 69. Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 416 P.3d 824, 837 (Ariz. 2018). 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 71. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (opinion of Hand, J.). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 (AM. L. INST. 2010).  
  
438 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:420 
 
This problem can be fixed: the substantive framework of the 
Restatement (Third) does not entail the complete elimination of 
foreseeability from duty, even though it correctly “disapproves” the 
“widespread use of foreseeability in no-duty determinations” in order to 
“protect the traditional function of the jury as factfinder.”73  According to 
the Restatement (Third), “No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court 
can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law 
applicable to a general class of cases.”74  A legal rule that limits duty to the 
risks of foreseeable harm satisfies this requirement without authorizing 
judges to make case-specific findings of foreseeability. 
A legal rule limiting duty to foreseeable harms is no different from any 
other legal rule of general application.  For example, the tort of trespass on 
land is nothing other than a general rule obligating individuals not to 
“trespass on another’s land.”  Judges then specify further legal rules 
defining the elements of trespass, and the jury ultimately determines how 
these rules apply to the case at hand.  So, too, a legal rule that limits duty to 
foreseeable harms specifies an element of negligence liability that 
categorically applies to all negligence cases, which is different from its 
case-specific application by the jury.  Consequently, a legal rule that limits 
duty to foreseeable harms for all negligence cases does not misapply 
foreseeability in the case-specific manner that is defensibly disapproved of 
by the Restatement (Third). 
The categorical limitation of duty to foreseeable harms, moreover, is 
required in order to limit the standard of reasonable care to a consideration 
of only those harms as required by the Restatement (Third).75  Courts 
cannot import a requirement of foreseeability into the determination of 
whether the defendant breached the duty to exercise reasonable care if they 
have previously concluded that foreseeability does not limit the duty that 
has been breached.76 
Once the plaintiff has proven that the defendant breached the duty and 
factually caused the harm in question, the court must then decide the case-
specific issue of whether the plaintiff’s injury is within the general class of 
foreseeable harms encompassed by the tort duty.  The Restatement (Third) 
 
 73. Id. § 7 cmt. j. 
 74. Id. cmt. a. 
 75. Compare id. cmt. j (“Foreseeable risk is an element in the determination of negligence.”), 
with supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (explaining why duty determines the types of risks 
governed by the standard of reasonable care). 
 76. This problem has not been recognized by courts that have followed the approach in the 
Restatement (Third).  See, e.g., A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 914–16 
(Neb. 2010) (eliminating foreseeability from duty and concluding, without analysis, that the 
standard of reasonable care only considers foreseeable risks). 
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properly places this issue within the element of proximate cause or scope of 
liability for the jury to resolve.77  The entire negligence framework in the 
Restatement (Third) can be squared with the rule adopted by the vast 
majority of courts that categorically limits duty to foreseeable harms 
threatened by the risky conduct.78 
To be sure, this framework logically locates the case-specific issue of 
the plaintiff’s foreseeability within the element of duty—the approach taken 
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. that has been followed by most 
courts.79  In Palsgraf, for example, the court first adopted the legal rule 
limiting duty to the foreseeable victims of the unreasonable conduct.80  
Having resolved this duty issue in a manner that categorically applies to all 
negligence claims, the court then addressed the case-specific question of 
plaintiff foreseeability, concluding that there was no duty because the 
negligent conduct did not foreseeably threaten the plaintiff.81 
The court’s holdings in Palsgaf did not supplant the role of the jury.  
According to the Restatement (Third), “[w]hen resolution of disputed 
adjudicative facts bears on the existence or scope of a duty, the case should 
be submitted to the jury with alternative instructions.”82  In Palsgraf, the 
foreseeability of the plaintiff was not a disputed adjudicative fact: the 
parties, “by concession,” had agreed that the negligent conduct did not 
foreseeably threaten the plaintiff.83  Due to this concession, the court could 
make this case-specific ruling as a matter of law without usurping the role 
of the jury.  But when the parties contest the plaintiff’s foreseeability, the 
jury can be instructed that in order to consider whether the defendant 
breached the duty to exercise reasonable care, it must first decide that the 
plaintiff was foreseeably threatened by the allegedly negligent conduct.  
The element of duty can accommodate case-specific determinations of 
plaintiff foreseeability in a manner that fully protects the jury’s role as 
finder of fact. 
 
 77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“When liability depends on factors specific to an individual case, the 
appropriate rubric is scope of liability.”). 
 78. See supra notes 29, 60 and accompanying text. 
 79. 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (concluding that because defendant owed no duty to the 
unforeseeable plaintiff, “[t]he law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case 
before us”).  See also supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing widespread adoption of 
this rule across the country).  
 80. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100. 
 81. Id. at 101. 
 82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 83. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101. 
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Too many judges, however, have used the element of duty to take over 
the jury’s role in making case-specific determinations of foreseeability.  To 
avoid this problem, the Restatement (Third) has moved this particular issue 
from the element of duty to the element of proximate cause.  An 
unforeseeable plaintiff necessarily suffers an unforeseeable harm, so the 
defendant’s negligence is never the proximate cause of such an injury.  By 
relocating every case-specific issue of foreseeability to the element of 
proximate cause, the Restatement (Third) ensures that juries will decide the 
matter.  When properly applied, this approach leaves untouched the other 
holding in Palsgraf that defines duty in the categorical, relational terms of 
foreseeability, which in turn fully justifies the foreseeability test for 
proximate cause. 
B. The Inexorable Logic of the Risk Standard 
Courts that employ the directness test for proximate cause cannot 
impose liability on a defendant whose tortious conduct only caused 
unforeseeable injuries that are wholly outside of the duty.  Doing so would 
impermissibly subject the defendant to legal liability in the absence of any 
legal obligation for the injury.  The directness test must require that the 
defendant caused at least some foreseeable harm governed by the duty.  
Courts have implicitly recognized as much when applying the directness 
test in the liability phase of the case. 
Courts limit the directness test for reasons illustrated by the well-
known case Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, in which the defendant railroad 
was negligently speeding when its train was struck by a falling tree, injuring 
the plaintiff.84  If the train had instead been operating at the reduced 
reasonable speed, it would not have been located on the track at the point 
where the tree fell.  The crash would seem to have been a direct 
consequence of the excessive speed as required by the directness test, but 
the Berry court found otherwise:  “The same thing might as readily have 
happened to a car running slowly, or it might have been that a high speed 
alone would have carried him beyond the tree to a place of safety.”85  It was 
merely a coincidence that the tree fell on the speeding train, severing the 
necessary causal link between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s 
injury. 
Cases like this have led courts to adopt the risk standard, a “principle 
which excludes liability where the injury sprang from a hazard different 
 
 84. 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899). 
 85. Id. at 240. 
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from that which was improperly risked.”86  The injury in Berry was caused 
by a falling tree, a hazard different from the injuries the defendant railroad 
had improperly risked by speeding.  The risk standard limits liability to 
injuries caused by a tortious hazard or risk (the dangerously high speed of a 
train), absolving the defendant of liability for injuries coincidentally 
connected to the tortious behavior (a falling tree). 
For largely the same reasons, the risk standard prevents a defendant 
from incurring liability for only causing harms that were entirely 
unforeseeable.  In Berry, the train’s speed did not affect the risk of a tree 
falling—the crash was a coincidence.  The defendant’s safety decision 
could not have reasonably accounted for the countless coincidental 
outcomes that might also follow. Consequently, the coincidental harm 
caused by the falling tree was unforeseeable and outside the scope of the 
defendant’s duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting the speed of the 
train.87 
To be sure, an unforeseeable harm is not always coincidental.  A 
defendant’s tortious conduct could increase an unforeseeable risk of harm, 
unlike the conduct in Berry.  But as long as the duty is limited to 
foreseeable harms, the defendant’s breach of duty is wholly defined by the 
tortious or unreasonable risks threatening those harms.  Such a tortious risk 
cannot cause an unforeseeable harm, so the risk standard ensures that the 
defendant incurs liability only for injuries governed by the tort duty. 
Consider again the case in which the defendant was negligent for not 
taking a precaution B1 that would have eliminated a risk of foreseeable 
physical harm PL1, and that the plaintiff was instead injured by an 
unforeseeable risk PL2 that would also have been eliminated if the 
defendant had exercised reasonable care.  Under the Hand formula, the 
jury’s finding of negligence implies that B1 < PL1.  Although the exercise of 
reasonable care would also have eliminated the unforeseeable risk PL2, that 
risk is not tortious because it is excluded from the duty and does not factor 
into the standard of reasonable care.  The occurrence of this unforeseeable 
harm instead is “coincidental” in the sense that it would have been 
prevented if the defendant had complied with a tort duty that did not 
account for the harm.88 
 
 86. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 723 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 87. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, § 205 (“When courts say that such a risk is unforeseeable 
what they mean is that it is not a risk enhanced or created by the defendant’s conduct.”); Simler v. 
Dubuque Paint Equip. Servs., 942 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding that negligent 
speeding by another driver was not foreseeable and recognizing that “[t]he analysis is different, 
however, if the initial act increases the likelihood that others will act negligently”). 
 88. By contrast, the risk is not coincidental but instead tortious if the duty encompasses the 
unforeseeable risk of harm.  See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
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In adopting the risk standard that limits liability “to those harms that 
result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious,”89 the 
Restatement (Third) explains that it “provides a more refined analytical 
standard than a foreseeability standard or an amorphous direct-
consequences test.”90  The foreseeability standard can be unnecessarily 
confusing because courts still sometimes resort to the historical practice of 
deeming a type of injury to be unforeseeable in order to categorically limit 
liability for policy reasons, even though risky actors can easily anticipate 
the harms.91  In addition to eliminating this lingering ambiguity in the 
meaning of foreseeability, the risk standard unifies the directness and 
foreseeability tests for proximate cause in the liability phase of the case.  
Finally, the risk standard is also appropriate for rules of strict liability,92 
making it the most general formulation of the causal inquiry in cases of 
accidental harm. 
C. The Characterization of Tortious Risk 
To establish proximate cause under the risk standard, the evidence 
must show that the plaintiff suffered some foreseeable harm, like bodily 
injury, caused by the type of risk that made the defendant’s conduct 
tortious.  Resolution of this issue critically depends on how the court 
characterizes the tortious risk. 
The plaintiff would like to define the tortious risk as broadly as 
possible.  The most expansive definition is “the risk of harm,” which 
 
 89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 90. Id. cmt. e. 
 91. For example, in addressing the issue of social–host liability—whether one who provides 
alcohol to a guest owes a duty to third parties who might be harmed in a crash caused by the 
inebriated guest while driving home—“the deciding factor for most courts is whether a guest’s 
intoxication and subsequent risk-laden conduct was foreseeable to a reasonable person in the 
social host’s position.”  W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and 
Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 763 (2005).  
Given the widespread incidence of drunk driving, the risk is easily anticipated by the social host.  
These courts accordingly use the terminology of foreseeability to limit liability based on 
“considerations of broad public policy.”  Id. at 765; see also Geistfeld, Policy-Based Limitations 
of Duty, supra note 32, at 907–16 (discussing the public policy considerations that courts invoke 
in considering whether social hosts should be subject to such a tort duty and showing how these 
concerns can defensibly limit the duty). 
 92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 cmt. l (AM. L. INST. 2010); Covey v. Brishka, 445 P.3d 785, 792–93 (Mont. 2019) (applying 
the rule that “strict liability is limited to instances of harm that made the activity or condition 
abnormally dangerous”).  For example, the rule of strict liability governing dog bites is based on 
the dog’s vicious or dangerous propensities, so one court concluded that it does not apply to a 
“ranch’s herding dog nipping at a cow, causing the cow to charge into the employee” plaintiff.  
Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., 921 N.W.2d 820, 823, 826 (Neb. 2019). 
  
2021] PROXIMATE CAUSE UNTANGLED 443 
 
establishes proximate cause anytime the defendant was a factual cause of 
the injury.  This characterization of the tortious risk effectively eliminates 
proximate cause as an additional limitation of liability, making it too broad. 
The defendant, by contrast, would prefer to narrowly define the 
tortious risk.  The most restrictive definition includes all details of the 
accident, turning the tortious risk into the prospect that the particular 
plaintiff would suffer the particular injury at a particular time on a particular 
date at a particular location.  This characterization effectively requires 
omniscience, an unrealistic behavioral obligation far more demanding than 
foreseeability. 
Between these two extremes lies the appropriate characterization of the 
tortious risk.  According to the Restatement (Third), “No rule can be 
provided about the appropriate level of generality or specificity to employ 
in characterizing the type of harm for purposes” of establishing proximate 
cause.93  
This depiction of the inquiry lends support to the claim that 
foreseeability is inherently indeterminate. According to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, “If one takes a broad enough view, all consequences of a negligent 
act, no matter how far removed in time or space, may be foreseen.  
Conditioning liability on foreseeability, therefore, is hardly a condition at 
all.”94 The problem, as another critic explained, is that “almost anything is 
foreseeable, given enough time and incentive to project possible 
consequences, [so] a test formulated in terms of ‘foreseeable consequences’ 
provides no definite guidance for decision.”95  
This critique misstates the relevant inquiry.  The issue is not whether a 
risk or the associated harm is foreseeable if one had unlimited time and 
resources to consider the matter; the inquiry is whether the defendant knew 
or should have known about the risk.96  “The term should have known . . . is 
one way of saying that the reasonable person standard governs the question 
of unreasonable risk and foreseeability. . . .”97  Whether a risk is reasonable 
“involves some manner of balancing the costs or burdens of mitigating it 
against the likelihood and severity of the injuries it threatens.”98  So, too, 
whether a risk is reasonably foreseeable also turns on a balancing of these 
 
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 94. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 553 (1994) (emphasis in original).  
 95. Kelley, supra note 2, at 92. 
 96. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 159. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Grubb v. Smith, 523 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Ky. 2017) (observing that this condition has been 
“widely understood” from “United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) to 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm (2010)”). 
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factors.  Reasonable foreseeability depends on costs or burdens for the 
undeniable reason that risky actors do not have unlimited time and 
resources to consider every possible consequence of their behavior. 
For example, product sellers have a duty to warn about foreseeable 
product risks.99  As an implication of this duty, the “seller bears 
responsibility to perform reasonable testing prior to marketing a product 
and to discover risks and risk-avoidance measures that such testing would 
reveal.  A seller is charged with knowledge of what reasonable testing 
would reveal.”100  Whether a seller should have known about a product 
risk—whether the associated harm is foreseeable—accordingly depends on 
whether it would be discovered by “reasonable testing,” a form of 
reasonable care that depends on the costs and safety benefits of acquiring 
information about product risk.101  Reasonable foreseeability does not 
require sellers to expend unlimited time and resources to consider every 
possible way in which their products might cause harm. 
The concept of reasonableness, however, does not independently limit 
the meaning of foreseeability.  Within a tort claim, a foreseeable risk is one 
that a reasonable person would account for when making the decision in 
question.  Such a risk is necessarily reasonably foreseeable.  Adding the 
proviso of reasonableness simply underscores the behavioral idea that risky 
actors are not omniscient and cannot realistically make safety decisions by 
considering every potential outcome, no matter how far-fetched.102  Instead, 
a foreseeable harm is one that is “reasonably anticipatable” at the time of 
the safety decision in question.103 
By definition, risky actors cannot identify unforeseeable harms at the 
time of a safety decision, and so these risks are excluded from the duty to 
exercise reasonable care.  “The goal of the law is to induce conduct that is 
capable of being performed.  That goal is not advanced by imposing 
 
 99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 100. Id. cmt. m. 
 101. Id.  See also id. cmt. a (observing that products with defective or inadequate warnings are 
not “reasonably safe,” and so liability “achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability 
predicated on negligence”).  Indeed, the costs of acquiring and processing information about 
product risk determine the scope and content of the tort duties generally owed by sellers to 
consumers.  See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 45–52 (3d ed. 2020). 
 102. Cf. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 128 (describing the attributes of the reasonable 
person in terms of “normal intelligence” and “normal perception”). 
 103. Foreseeability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see, e.g., Gay v. O.F. 
Mossberg & Sons, Inc., No. 200–P–0006, 2009 WL 1743939, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. June 19, 
2009) (“Ostensibly, this [allegedly foreseeable injury] would suggest that [defendant 
manufacturer] should have foreseen these events and, therefore, should have foreseen the need for 
[the safety precaution in question] at the time of manufacture. . . .”). 
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liability for . . . risks that were not capable of being known.”104  An outcome 
that is wholly unforeseeable is also not fairly attributable to the actor’s 
exercise of agency or autonomy.105  For good reasons made apparent by a 
behavioral conception of foreseeability, tort law absolves individuals of 
legal responsibility for unforeseeable harms through a limitation of duty.106 
In addition to explaining why only certain harms are foreseeable, the 
behavioral conception also rebuts a related claim that the foreseeability test 
is inherently indeterminate because there are no “limits on permissible 
descriptions” of the tortious risk, making “the foreseeability rule of 
proximate cause . . . completely vacuous in the judicial decisions that it 
dictates.”107  Under the behavioral conception, the permissible descriptions 
of foreseeable harms are framed by the safety decision in question, which in 
turn makes the case-specific foreseeability test of proximate cause 
adequately determinate. 
If the foreseeability test were completely vacuous in the proximate 
cause phase of the case, then the standard of reasonable care would also be 
completely vacuous.  To be sure, this standard does not involve “a binary 
choice (foreseeable/unforeseeable), but only seek[s] a probability” that the 
risky conduct will cause injury.108  To compute any probability, however, 
the decision-maker must rely on a reference class of causally related 
outcomes.  The reference class of “coin tosses,” for example, is a set of 
outcomes for which the flip of the same coin is governed by the same set of 
causal conditions.  Based on the relative frequency of heads and tails within 
this reference class of causally related outcomes, one can then derive a 
probability assessment that any given toss will be heads or tails.  The 
reference classes that generate probability assessments employ the same 
type of categorical reasoning embodied in the behavioral conception of 
 
 104. Vassallo v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922–23 (Mass. 1998) (discussing 
the duty to warn). 
 105. Cf. Stephen Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 92 (Gerald Postema ed. 2001) (“The normative power 
of this conception . . . resides in the idea that the exercise of a person’s positive agency, under 
circumstances in which a harmful outcome could have been foreseen and avoided, leads us to 
regard her as the author of the outcome.”).  See also supra note 27 and accompanying text 
(describing the Holmesian rationale for foreseeability). 
 106. See supra notes 29, 60 and accompanying text. 
 107. Michael S. Moore, Foreseeing Harm Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL 
LAW 125, 127 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993). 
 108. Id. at 155 (arguing that foreseeability is not necessary for determining the requirements of 
reasonable care). 
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foreseeability. Hence the standard of reasonable care cannot be adequately 
determinate unless foreseeability is adequately determinate.109 
When individuals make safety decisions of the type governed by the 
duty to exercise reasonable care, they consider categories of causally related 
injuries or general fields of danger in order to make meaningful predictions.  
These categories determine the foreseeable harms that factor into the 
standard of reasonable care, which in turn structures the inquiry for 
determining whether the particular harm in the case at hand was 
foreseeable. 
“Categorization is one of the most basic cognitive functions.”110  
Because of their predictive function, “[c]ategories tend to form around 
clusters of causally related features.”111  Consequently, individuals 
have a preferred level of categorization.  When observing a 
canary, for example, most people do not categorize it as an 
animal or a canary; rather, they prefer to include it in the category 
‘bird.’  The preference for a basic-level categorization appears to 
be based on the need to maximize inferential, predictive potential.  
Hence, for someone who is not an ornithologist, the basic-level 
categorization of a canary will be as a bird, as this way to 
categorize it maximizes at once distinctiveness and 
informativeness, allowing meaningful predictions to be made.112 
While driving an automobile, for example, the reasonable person 
considers how a particular precaution such as reduced speed would reduce 
the risk of injury faced by the basic-level categories of nearby drivers, 
bikers, pedestrians, and property owners.  The safety decision does not 
 
 109. Cf. Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2009) (“Statistical inferences depend critically on how people, events, or 
things are classified.  The problem is that there is an infinite number of possible characteristics, 
and (purportedly) no principle for privileging certain characteristics over others.  As a result, 
statistics arguably become highly manipulable.”). 
 110. James E. Corter & Mark A. Gluck, Explaining Basic Categories: Feature Predictability 
and Information, 111 PSYCH. BULL. 291, 291 (1992). 
 111. Bob Rehder & Russell C. Burnett, Feature Inference and Causal Structure of Categories, 
50 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 264, 265, 306 (2005) (reporting results of a study indicating that “people 
take characteristic features [of a category] as diagnostic of the . . . underlying causal 
mechanisms”). See also, e.g., Brett K. Hayes & Bob Rehder, The Development of Causal 
Categorization, 36 COGNITIVE SCI. 1102, 1102 (2012) (“It is well established that causal 
knowledge plays an important role in adult categorization.  Adults are more likely to assign an 
object to a category if it has the same causal features as known category members.”); Woo-
kyoung Ahn & Nancy S. Kim, The Causal Status Effect in Categorization: An Overview, 40 
PSYCH.  LEARNING & MOTIVATION, 23, 37 (2001) (reviewing existing studies and concluding that 
the causal status effect “may be the underlying mechanism for phenomena involving the use of 
categories in reasoning”). 
 112. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF 
SOCIAL NORMS 89 (2006).  
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depend on the particular identities of these differently situated individuals, 
nor does the decision turn on the precise manner in which a crash might 
occur—these details are unnecessary for the driver to make meaningful 
predictions about how a precaution will reduce the risk of crash faced by 
these causally related parties in the zone of danger.  These behavioral 
reasons fully explain why the standard of reasonable care considers the 
general class of harms foreseeably threatened by the risky behavior.113  
The plaintiff’s allegation of breach—that the defendant was driving at 
an unreasonably dangerous speed, for example—accordingly defines 
tortious risk in terms of the general categories of foreseeable harms 
threatened by the negligent behavior.  Once the plaintiff has proven that the 
defendant breached the duty and factually caused the harm in question, the 
court must then decide whether this particular injury was a foreseeable 
consequence of the negligence.  In resolving the case-specific question of 
foreseeability, “the pertinent inquiry is not whether the actual harm was of a 
particular kind which was expectable.  Rather, the question is whether the 
actual harm fell within a general field of danger which should have been 
anticipated.”114 
This formulation of proximate cause does not depend on jurors sharing 
identical conceptions of the “general field of danger which should have 
been anticipated.”  The general field is nothing other than a basic-level 
categorization or reference class that individuals use for evaluating risky 
outcomes.  Different jurors can rely on significantly different reference 
classes and still agree about the foreseeability of a particular outcome when 
their basic-level categories overlap.  Individual differences of this type 
explain why a conclusion about foreseeability can be easy or obvious in 
some cases and controversial in others. 
Consider the following example: 
In some cases, damages resulting from misconduct are so typical 
that judge and jurors cannot possibly be convinced that they were 
unforeseeable.  If Mr Builder negligently drops a brick on Mr 
Pedestrian who is passing an urban site of a house under 
construction, even though the dent in Pedestrian’s skull is 
 
 113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 3 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010) (describing the “risk” relevant to the standard of reasonable care in 
terms of the “overall level of foreseeable risk created by the actor’s conduct”). 
 114. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 19 (Md. 1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting McLeod 
v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d. 360, 363 (Wash. 1953)).  See also DOBBS ET AL., 
supra note 8, § 159 (“But without identifying all the possible versions of speed-related harm, we 
can surely foresee broad categories of risks and harms to persons and property resulting because 
the driver might lose control.”). 
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microscopically unique in pattern, Builder could not sensibly 
maintain that the injury was unforeseeable.115  
The argument of Builder is a clear loser because it relies on a causal 
model or reference class for computing probabilities that incorporates too 
much detail from the case at hand.  Such an excessive overfit of the data is 
inherently lacking in adequate predictive value: “overfitted models capture 
not only the relationship of interest, but also the random errors or 
fluctuations that inevitably accompany real world data.”116  When the causal 
model or reference class for predicting whether a dropped brick will hit 
someone on the street below depends on the microscopically unique pattern 
of the individual’s skull, the inherent variation in that factor will produce 
unnecessary random errors across cases—it “makes more errors in 
predicting . . . than a simpler model that ignores the noise.”117  Builder’s 
argument that foreseeability depends on the unique pattern of the plaintiff’s 
skull is easily rejected on the ground that the reasonable person would make 
predictions about possible harms by relying on a simpler causal model that 
ignores this detail.118 
So, too, if the plaintiff argues that foreseeability is simply defined by 
the occurrence of physical harm, that argument is also a clear loser for the 
opposite reason: it depends on a causal model or reference class that 
obviously underfits the data in the case at hand.  “Too simple a model will 
fail to identify the underlying relationship and have low predictive 
accuracy.”119 
As these examples illustrate, the choice of the appropriate reference 
class for computing probabilities involves a tradeoff “between fit and 
complexity”—the need to track the limited data that are available while also 
abstracting away from the details to simplify the causal model in the hope 
of enhancing predictive accuracy for future cases.120  Statisticians rely on 
different criteria for evaluating this tradeoff,121 and lay individuals like 
jurors presumably do the same.  A hard or contested case of foreseeability, 
therefore, involves instances in which jurors disagree about the appropriate 
 
 115. CLARENCE MORRIS, TORTS 174–77 (1953).  
 116. Cheng, supra note 109, at 2092. 
 117. Id. at 2093. 
 118. Because the inquiry asks what outcomes would be foreseeable to the reasonable person, it 
is not subject to the critique that the defendant might have defined foreseeability differently. But 
see Moore, supra note 107, at 154 (rejecting the foreseeability test, in part, because “the typing of 
harms (under which we are to ask, was it foreseeable) is . . . wholly dependent on the level of 
typing done by the actor as he framed his intentions or his beliefs”). 
 119. Cheng, supra note 109, at 2093. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 2093–94. 
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tradeoff and rely on different reference classes that lead to differing 
conclusions about risk and foreseeability in the case at hand. 
Because there is no single best method for determining the optimal 
specification of a reference class, the jury is particularly well suited for 
applying the behavioral conception of foreseeability to determine both 
breach and proximate cause.122  “[D]eciding what is reasonably foreseeable 
involves common sense, common experience, and application of the 
standards and behavioral norms of the community—matters that have long 
been understood to be uniquely the province of the finder of fact.”123 
D. An Illustration of How Courts Characterize Tortious Risk 
To see how a behavioral conception of foreseeability frames the 
inquiry for proximate cause, consider the tort claims stemming from the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.  The 
attacks were unprecedented and unforeseeable in many profoundly 
important respects.  “[T]errorists had not previously used a hijacked 
airplane as a suicidal weapon to destroy buildings and murder thousands,” 
so the defendant owners and operators of the buildings moved to dismiss 
the plaintiffs’ tort claims because “they had no duty to anticipate and guard 
against deliberate and suicidal aircraft crashes into the Towers, and because 
any alleged negligence on their part was not a proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs’ injuries.”124 
Despite the extraordinary nature of the events on September 11, the 
court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint were legally 
sufficient to establish both duty and proximate cause.125  The rationale for 
this ruling fully illustrates how the plaintiff’s allegation of breach—the 
identification of the reasonable safety precaution that the defendant failed to 
take—frames the analysis of foreseeability for purposes of duty and 
proximate cause: 
[D]efendants contend that they owed no duty to “anticipate and 
guard against crimes unprecedented in human history.”  Plaintiffs 
argue that defendants owed a duty, not to foresee the crimes, but 
to have designed, constructed, repaired and maintained the World 
 
 122. Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models 
of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 112 (2007) (“[N]othing in the natural world privileges or 
picks out one of the classes as the right one; rather, our interests in the various inferences they 
generate pick out certain classes as more or less relevant.”). 
 123. A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Neb. 2010). 
 124. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  In the interest of 
full disclosure, I provided legal advice on this matter to the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, so 
my role in that capacity might bias the following discussion. 
 125. Id. at 301–02. 
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Trade Center structures to withstand the effects and spread of fire, 
to avoid building collapses caused by fire and, in designing and 
effectuating fire safety and evacuation procedures, to provide for 
the escape of more people.126 
Of course, the fire that destroyed the World Trade Center was not an 
ordinary fire; it was caused by an unprecedented criminal act of terrorism.  
This detail, however, does not factor into the definition of tortious risk 
alleged by the plaintiffs for readily understandable behavioral reasons, 
explaining why the court rejected the defendants’ arguments about the 
harms being unforeseeable and outside the scope of the tort duty. 
Relying on established precedent, the court recognized that those who 
own and operate commercial buildings have a duty to “adopt reasonable 
fire-safety precautions, . . . regardless of the origin of the fire.”127  The 
general threat of fire motivates the adoption of reasonably safe procedures 
for retarding fires and enabling occupants to quickly evacuate the building.  
Safe egress from a burning building is all that matters, regardless of how 
the fire originated—whether electrical problems or arson.  And because the 
safety decision does not depend on the source of the fire, the motives of 
arsonists (or terrorists) in setting a particular fire are not relevant to the 
foreseeability analysis.  A behavioral conception of foreseeability fully 
explains why the duty encompasses “fires caused by criminals,” including 
the fires caused by the terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Center.128 
Based on the plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence, they were 
foreseeably harmed by the defendants’ failure to adopt reasonably safe 
methods of fire protection.  To be sure, these reasonable precautions would 
not necessarily have saved all the victims from dying in the horrific fire, but 
that issue is one of factual causation, not legal or proximate cause.  The 
particular injuries suffered by those victims who would have escaped were 
clearly within the general category of harms that would have been 
eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care, establishing foreseeability as 
a matter of proximate cause.129 
In addition to illustrating why foreseeability is not inherently 
indeterminate, the World Trade Center case shows why proximate cause is 
 
 126. Id. at 299. 
 127. Id. (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. 
 129. “Large-scale fire was precisely the risk against which the WTC defendants had a duty to 
guard and which they should have reasonably foreseen.”  Id. at 302.  In light of the court’s holding 
that the tort duty does not depend on the origin of a fire, it is hard to see what type of evidence 
would negate proximate cause for those who were killed by the fires, even though the court left 
open the possibility that “[d]iscovery will either supply evidence to substantiate or eviscerate the 
parties’ divergent claims about foreseeability.”  Id. 
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more structured than an alternative formulation of the doctrine based on 
how “people ordinarily think about causation and morality.”130  As a matter 
of ordinary thinking about causation and morality, the terrorists destroyed 
the World Trade Center and murdered the occupants who were unable to 
escape the ensuing fire, which makes it hard to explain why the owner and 
operator of the buildings—innocent victims of the attack—were also 
proximate causes of those wrongful deaths.131  In effect, this is exactly the 
type of argument made by the defendants and rejected by the court.   
Proximate cause formulates the inquiry in a different manner; it 
decides the liability of a defendant whose tortious conduct factually caused 
the plaintiff to suffer compensable harm.  To determine whether this factual 
cause was also a proximate cause, jurors must know why they are asking 
the question.  The foreseeability test or risk standard frames the inquiry by 
asking whether the particular risk in the case at hand is of the general type 
that factors into the safety decision that the defendant was obligated to 
make as a matter of reasonable care.  This behavioral conception of 
foreseeability does not produce unambiguously clear answers in all cases, 
but it still structures the inquiry in an adequately determinate manner that 
does not dissolve into an all-things-considered moral determination of 
causality. 
How lay individuals think about the morality of risky behavior instead 
guides jurors in determining the requirements of reasonable care.132  In 
making this normative judgment, jurors consider the categories of 
foreseeable harms risked by the defendant’s conduct and encompassed by 
the duty.  The element of proximate cause then requires jurors to determine 
whether the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff is within one of these 
general categories—the approach embodied in the foreseeability test and its 
substantive equivalent, the risk standard. 
III. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THE DAMAGES PHASE OF THE CASE  
For cases in which the risk standard is satisfied, the tortious risk must 
have proximately caused the plaintiff some foreseeable compensable harm, 
completing the plaintiff’s proof of the prima facie case (duty, breach, 
 
 130. Joshua Knobe & Scott Shapiro, Proximate Cause Explained: An Essay in Experimental 
Jurisprudence, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 169 (2021) (arguing that such an inquiry explains 
proximate cause in tort cases). 
 131. See id. at 223–24 (explaining why “malicious or criminal acts” are more “morally 
abnormal than the original defendant’s negligence,” and so these “intervening cause[s] will 
supersede the defendant’s liability”). 
 132. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Folk Tort Law, in HANDBOOK OF PRIVATE LAW 
THEORIES 338 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020) (arguing that jurors apply 
social norms of reciprocity to evaluate the reasonableness of risky behavior in negligence cases). 
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causation, and damage).  Having established liability, the plaintiff must then 
prove the amount of damages. 
Like the element of proximate cause in the prima facie case, the 
damages inquiry involves a causal question.  “One injured by the tort of 
another is entitled to recover damages from the other for all harm, past, 
present and prospective, legally caused by the tort.”133  The test for legal or 
proximate cause in the damages phase of the case must address a normative 
problem that does not exist in the prima facie case, and that difference 
explains why the directness test has been widely adopted. 
A. The Equitable Logic of the Direct-Consequences Test 
“Even when a foreseeability standard is employed for scope of 
liability, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the 
extent of harm caused by the tortious conduct does not affect the actor’s 
liability for the harm.”134  This principle is called the eggshell-plaintiff or 
thin-skull rule when applied to an individual’s preexisting physical 
condition.135 
The eggshell-plaintiff rule is nothing other than the directness test in 
the damages phase of the case.  Under the directness or direct-consequences 
test, “‘[l]iability is imposed for all consequences that follow, without the 
intervention of new external forces, in unbroken natural sequence from the 
original act.”136  According to the eggshell-plaintiff rule, even if the 
defendant could not foresee that the plaintiff had some preexisting 
susceptibility to physical harm (the thin skull), the defendant incurs liability 
for the full extent of the physical harm directly caused by the tortious 
conduct (a crushed skull from an impact that would foreseeably cause only 
minor harm).  As long as the tortious conduct foreseeably caused some 
compensable harm (a bruise or bump on the head), the extent of harm (the 
crushed skull) does not have to be foreseeable when directly caused by the 
tortious force (the blow to the head).  Describing the inquiry in terms of the 
eggshell-plaintiff rule is certainly more evocative, but it is nothing more 
than a particular application of the directness test in the damages phase of 
the case. 
The connection between the eggshell-plaintiff rule and directness test 
is long standing.  When courts first formulated the element of proximate 
 
 133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (AM. L. INST. 1979). 
 134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 cmt. p (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 135. Id. § 31 cmt. a. 
 136. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 20.6. 
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cause, they relied on damage cases.137  The eggshell-plaintiff rule governs 
the determination of damages, so framing proximate cause by reference to 
this class of cases naturally produced the directness test. 
“[E]xtensive research has failed to identify a single United States case 
disavowing the rule.”138  In applying this rule, jurisdictions that use the 
foreseeability test for proximate cause in the prima facie case effectively 
apply the directness test in the damages phase of the case.139  The eggshell-
plaintiff rule accordingly unifies the directness and foreseeability tests in 
the damages phase of the case, much like the risk standard unifies these 
tests in the prima facie case. 
The rationale for the eggshell-plaintiff rule, however, has never been 
clearly identified.  It produces a “result that has been attacked as one quite 
inconsistent with the prevailing limitation on the scope of duty to interests 
and hazards that are foreseeable.”140  In defense of this rule, a leading 
treatise argues that “[t]here is no reason to apply the restrictive 
foreseeability test to all problems just because it is applied to some.”141  The 
different tests, on this view, represent “a practical compromise where 
policies conflict.”142  The same sort of practical compromise underlies the 
Restatement (Third)’s reasoning that the eggshell-plaintiff rule is merely a 
matter of “administrative convenience” that avoids the “sometimes 
uncertain and indeterminate inquiry into whether the extent of the harm was 
unforeseeable.”143  The eggshell-plaintiff rule seems fair enough, but the 
reasoning behind this conclusion has been elusive. 
Once conceptualized as a rule of proximate cause governing the 
determination of damages, the eggshell-plaintiff rule has an identifiable 
rationale.  As compared to the foreseeability test, the directness test more 
equitably resolves a normative problem that is distinctive to the damages 
phase of a tort case. 
Although liability is properly limited by the foreseeability test or risk 
standard in the prima facie case, this limitation can produce unfair measures 
 
 137. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 31 rep. note cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
 139. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing application of the directness test 
within jurisdictions that use the foreseeability test in order to subject a negligent defendant to 
liability for wrongful death caused by a trivial scratch of the skin that directly caused 
unforeseeable blood poisoning due to the decedent’s preexisting blood condition). 
 140. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 20.5. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 cmt. p (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
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of damages.  Compensatory damages are limited to the amount of harm 
suffered by the plaintiff, even if those damages are unforeseeably low.  A 
blow that would crush an ordinary skull, for example, could cause only 
minor injury to a hard-headed plaintiff, yielding a compensatory damages 
award substantially less than the foreseeable amount.  The foreseeability 
test would not prevent the defendant from paying damages that are much 
lower than would be foreseeable, whereas it would prevent the defendant 
from paying unforeseeably high damages (for the thin skull)—a one-sided 
advantage that is unfair for the plaintiff. 
By contrast, the directness test more fairly determines the extent of 
damages.  The defendant must pay for unforeseeably high damages directly 
caused by the tortious risk, the result attained by the eggshell-plaintiff rule 
for cases in which the tortious risk directly caused bodily injury.  Any 
unfairness for the defendant in this respect is adequately offset by the 
requirement that compensatory damages equal the amount of harm in 
question, limiting the defendant’s liability to actual harms that can be 
substantially less severe than the foreseeable harms.  Unlike the 
foreseeability test, the directness test does not confer a one-sided advantage 
on either party. 
In determining damages, tort law must place some limits on liability; a 
defendant’s liability cannot extend to all future harms factually caused by 
the tortious risk—the rationale for proximate cause in the first instance.  For 
indirect causes, courts defensibly limit liability by relying on 
foreseeability.144  The extent of damages proximately caused by the 
defendant’s tortious conduct, therefore, encompasses both direct harms and 
indirect, foreseeable harms—the rule embodied in the directness test.145   
Consistent with this reasoning, “[t]he weight of authority in this 
country rejects the limitation of damages to consequences foreseeable at the 
time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are ‘direct,’ and the 
damage, although other and greater than expectable, is of the same general 
sort that was risked.”146  Having caused damages of the “same general sort 
that was risked,” the defendant satisfies the foreseeability test in the liability 
phase of the case.  Any remaining causal issues are determined by the 
directness test, which makes the defendant liable for unforeseeably large 
harms (the crushed skull) directly caused by the tortious force acting on the 
predicate foreseeable compensable harm (the slight blow to the head). 
 
 144. See supra Part II.A (explaining the rationale for formulating the test for proximate cause 
in terms of foreseeable risks). 
 145. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 146. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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Once the directness test is framed by the eggshell-plaintiff rule, it also 
becomes apparent why courts and commentators have not adequately 
recognized that its application is limited to the determination of damages.  
The harm suffered by the plaintiff (the crushed skull) garners all the 
attention because it vastly exceeds the predicate compensable harm 
foreseeably caused by the tortious conduct (a slight bruise or bump), 
making it seem as if the liability question turns entirely on the unforeseen 
harm.  In the first instance, however, liability depends on the relatively 
minor foreseeable compensable harm, even though the extent of liability or 
amount of damages is almost wholly determined by the unforeseen injury. 
When conceptualized in terms of the eggshell-plaintiff rule, the 
meaning of a direct cause also becomes more transparent.  In the abstract, 
there is no reason to distinguish between a direct cause and an intervening 
cause.147  For the equitable reasons recognized by the eggshell-plaintiff rule, 
however, it would be unfair to limit a defendant’s liability when the 
plaintiff had a preexisting vulnerability to suffering unforeseeably large 
harm.  The directness test is wholly formulated to address this inequity 
while still placing limits on liability.  Within this conception, a direct cause 
operates directly on preexisting conditions to enhance a predicate 
compensable harm foreseeably suffered by the plaintiff.  Precisely 
identifying these preexisting conditions is not always easy, but the various 
rules regarding direct and intervening causes nevertheless coherently 
attempt to determine whether the injury in the case at hand is sufficiently 
analogous to the harms suffered by the thin-skulled plaintiff. 
For these same reasons, the directness test is not limited to bodily 
injuries.  The unfairness of the foreseeability test is made manifest by a 
comparison of the compensatory damages it would produce for a thin-
skulled plaintiff as compared to a hard-headed plaintiff; the unfairness, 
however, is not limited to bodily injuries or even to mental harms.148 
All of these points are fully illustrated by the Polemis case,149 which 
arguably involves the most (in)famous application of the directness test.  
The defendant’s employees negligently dropped a plank into the hold of a 
ship.  The dropped plank could have foreseeably damaged persons or cargo 
in the hold below or even the ship itself by denting its structure.  The plank 
 
 147. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 20.5 (“To the eye of philosophy the 
distinction between intervening and pre-existing causes of conditions is tenuous if it exists at 
all.”); see also supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (illustrating this problem). 
 148. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 31 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (limiting eggshell-plaintiff rule to preexisting bodily injuries and 
mental conditions), with id. § 29 cmt. p (recognizing that foreseeability does not necessarily limit 
liability when the extent of harm is unforeseeable). 
 149. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 (C.A. 1921) 
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instead threw a spark that unexpectedly ignited petroleum vapors, causing a 
fire that destroyed the ship.  The fire was not reasonably foreseeable, but 
the court nevertheless concluded that the defendant was liable for the entire 
harm.  As one of the justices concluded: 
[I]f the act would or might probably cause damage, the fact that 
the damage it in fact causes is not the exact kind of damage one 
would expect is immaterial, so long as the damage is in fact 
caused sufficiently by the negligent act, and not by the operation 
of independent causes having no connection with the negligent 
act, except that they could not avoid its results.150  
This holding has been interpreted to mean that the directness test can 
establish proximate cause in the prima facie case, regardless of 
foreseeability.151  This interpretation has made Polemis infamous for having 
adopted an overly expansive formulation of proximate cause that the court 
in Wagon Mound I subsequently rejected in favor of the foreseeability 
test.152  The facts, however, clearly show that the Polemis court was 
applying the eggshell-plaintiff rule, even though it did not expressly 
describe the inquiry in this manner. 
The defendant’s employees created a tortious risk of damaging the 
ship or its cargo by the concussive force of the dropped plank.  On landing 
in the hold below, the plank hit either the ship itself or some cargo—
otherwise the plank could not have caused a spark.  That damage may have 
been slight, but it nevertheless was both foreseeable and compensable.  The 
plaintiff’s proof accordingly established the prima facie case—the 
defendant had breached the duty to exercise reasonable care in a manner 
that caused the plaintiff to suffer some foreseeable compensable physical 
harm. 
The only remaining issue involved the extent of damages.  In addition 
to causing relatively minor physical harm by denting the ship or cargo, the 
tortious risk (concussive force) directly caused an unforeseeable fire that 
destroyed the entire ship.  The ship in this respect was vulnerable due to an 
 
 150. Id. at 577 (Scrutton, L. J.). 
 151. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4 , § 20.5 (observing that Polemis 
and another English case made it “appear[ ] . . . that liability would be extended there to entirely 
unforeseeable consequences”).  According to one interpretation of Polemis: “Consequences are 
proximate where defendant’s positive wrongful act is a cause in fact and there is no new cause 
either in the form of a positive act or omission of duty intervening between his wrong and the 
consequence.  This principle seems clear beyond the need of elucidation.  To no other causal 
agency than that of defendant’s can responsibility for the consequence be ascribed.”  Charles E. 
Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause (Part III: Proximate 
Consequences), 20 CAL. L. REV. 471, 473 (1932).  
 152. See Overseas Tankship (U.K) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (Wagon Mound I), 1961 
A.M.C. 962, 100 A.L.R. 2d 928 (Privy Council 1961) (overruling Polemis). 
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unforeseeable preexisting condition (petroleum vapors in the hold), which 
is wholly analogous to a thin-skulled individual’s unexpected vulnerability 
to injury from a slight blow to the head.  The liability in Polemis can be 
fully justified by the directness test limited to the determination of damages, 
even though the court did not expressly apply the test in this manner. 
Polemis figures prominently into the long-running debate about the 
respective merits of the directness and foreseeability tests.  For good 
reasons, courts and commentators have found it hard to choose between 
them.  The debate mistakenly assumes that a monolithic rule of proximate 
cause should apply throughout the tort claim.  However, each test has a 
distinctive role that only becomes clear once the element of proximate 
cause in the prima facie case is untangled from the role of proximate cause 
in the damages phase of the case.  Rather than treating the two tests as 
competing conceptions of proximate cause, this approach coherently 
utilizes both of them by recognizing that each one is the appropriate test for 
a distinctive causal inquiry required by normatively different phases of the 
tort case. 
Although the analysis so far has been largely framed in terms of 
negligence liability, it does not change in most cases of strict liability.  
“Typically, strict-liability torts require that some form of physical harm be 
foreseen.”153  Liability in the first instance depends on the foreseeability test 
or risk standard, whereas the amount of damages depends on the eggshell-
plaintiff rule or directness test.  The rules of proximate cause do not 
substantively differ for negligence and strict liability. 
B. Proximate Cause and Culpability: The Intentional Torts, 
Recklessness, and Criminal Liability 
The intentional torts might require a different analysis.  According to 
the Restatement (Third), “[a]n actor who intentionally or recklessly causes 
harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms than the harms for 
which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”154  The 
conventional rationale for this rule is that the risk standard (or foreseeability 
test) is inappropriate: “such a narrow scope of liability is especially 
unsatisfactory given the highly culpable nature of the tortfeasor’s act.”155  
 
 153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 cmt. j (AM. L.. INST. 2010).  See also id. cmt. l (explaining why the risk standard “is equally 
applicable to scope-of-liability limits on strict liability”). 
 154. Id. § 33(b). 
 155. Id. § 33 cmt. a. 
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On this view, the rule of proximate cause for intentional torts is importantly 
shaped by “the moral culpability of the actor.”156 
This reasoning further underscores the extent to which courts and 
commentators have failed to recognize that proximate cause in the prima 
facie case for liability normatively differs from proximate cause in the 
damages phase of the case.  Accounting for this difference fully explains 
why the rule of proximate cause for intentional torts inherently differs from 
the appropriate inquiry in cases of accidental harm, which in turn has 
implications for recklessness and criminal liability. 
Unlike rules of negligence or strict liability, the intentional torts do not 
require a separate inquiry into proximate cause in the prima facie case: 
In cases of intentional torts to the person and property—assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, for example—the tort itself is 
regarded as harmful and the plaintiff is always entitled to recover 
at least nominal damages and often entitled to recover a 
substantial sum without proof of any specific loss other than the 
tort itself.157   
Proof of an intentional tort establishes an entitlement to compensatory 
damages, limiting any discrete issues of proximate cause to the damages 
phase of the case.  
Applying the risk standard or foreseeability test would unfairly limit 
liability in these cases.  This problem is fully illustrated by the thin skull 
unforeseeably crushed by a slight blow constituting the intentional tort of 
battery.  Proof of the prima facie case for battery shows that the defendant 
intentionally caused the plaintiff to suffer a harmful bodily contact, and the 
crushed skull was directly caused by the tortious force operating on that 
predicate compensable harm.  Like any other intentional tort, proof of 
battery establishes an entitlement to compensatory damages, limiting the 
issue of proximate cause to an inquiry of whether the defendant should 
incur liability for the full extent of injuries factually caused by the tortious 
conduct.  Like the tort rules governing accidental harms, the issue of 
proximate cause for determining the damages owed by an intentional 
tortfeasor is fairly resolved by the directness test, not the foreseeability test. 
To be sure, the Restatement (Third) also applies the same rule of 
proximate cause to both intentionally caused harms and recklessly caused 
harms.158  The conduct in both instances is culpable.  In light of the long-
running confusion involving the appropriate test for proximate cause, it is 
 
 156. Id. § 33(b). 
 157. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 479. 
 158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 33 (b) (AM. L. INST. 2010).  
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not surprising that courts and commentators have exclusively focused on 
culpability as the reason for applying a more expansive test of proximate 
cause in order to punish intentional wrongdoers.159  Reasoning by analogy, 
such a causal rule should also presumably apply as a way to punish highly 
culpable forms of reckless behavior. 
Relying on culpability to extend the rule of proximate cause from the 
intentional torts to reckless behavior, however, misses the fundamental 
difference between these two forms of liability with respect to the scope of 
liability in the prima facie case.  Unlike the proof of an intentional tort, 
proof of reckless behavior does not establish liability without further proof 
that the wrongdoing was both a factual and proximate cause of at least some 
compensable harm suffered by the plaintiff.  A drunk driver who does not 
cause injury is not liable in tort for the reckless behavior; the behavior is 
wrongful for tort purposes only if it proximately causes compensable harm.  
As in the case of ordinary negligence, the prima facie case of liability for 
reckless behavior requires a separate finding of proximate cause, unlike the 
intentional torts. 
Recklessness is a species of negligence that involves a reprehensible 
breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care 160  The duty, however, does 
not consider the actor’s culpability or bad state of mind.161  Reckless 
behavior, therefore, does not expand the duty beyond the ordinary 
requirements of reasonable care, and so a reprehensible breach can result in 
liability only if the tortious conduct caused a foreseeable harm governed by 
the duty.  Reckless behavior that only causes unforeseeable injury falls 
entirely outside of the duty, eliminating the defendant’s legal responsibility 
for the injury.162  The inexorable logic that justifies the foreseeability test or 
risk standard within the prima facie case of negligence liability applies with 
equal force to reckless behavior, eliminating any defensible reason for 
crafting a rule of proximate cause distinct to recklessness.  
 
 159. See Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A 
Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 233 (2006) (concluding that “[t]he primary 
justification for imposing liability for unforeseeable consequences in cases of intentional 
wrongdoing . . . seems to be retributive”). 
 160. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 32 (“Both elements of recklessness—high risk and 
consciousness of the risk—bear some relationship to intent, but both fall somewhat short of 
intent. . . . In the overwhelming number of tort cases, the defendant’s liability turns on intent or 
negligence, so that recklessness is irrelevant except perhaps to show grounds for punitive 
damages.”) (paragraph structure omitted). 
 161. See id. § 126 (“A bad state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient to show negligence; 
conduct is everything . . . . The legal concept of negligence as unduly risky conduct distinct from 
state of mind reflects the law’s strong commitment to an objective standard of behavior.”). 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
  
460 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:420 
 
The greater culpability inherent in reckless behavior only becomes 
relevant after the plaintiff has established the prima facie case by proving 
that the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused some compensable 
harm.  “In the great majority of states, punitive (or ‘exemplary’) damages 
may be awarded when the plaintiff has suffered legally recognized harm 
and the tortfeasor has committed quite serious misconduct with a bad intent 
or bad state of mind such as malice.”163  Highly culpable conduct can merit 
more extensive liability, but only by triggering the remedy of punitive 
damages and not by altering the test for proximate cause in the prima facie 
case.164 
This conclusion has implications for the rule of proximate cause in 
criminal cases because  “the courts have generally treated legal causation in 
criminal law as in tort law.”165  Like tort law, criminal law applies the 
directness test to preexisting conditions such as the thin-skull.166  As we 
have found, however, culpability does not justify the directness test in tort 
law; the rationale, instead, involves the equitable resolution of a normative 
problem inherent in the calculation of damages—an issue not relevant to 
criminal law.  Perhaps there are normative reasons distinct to criminal law 
for applying the directness test, but the rationale cannot be derived from the 
common law of torts.167  Proximate cause must not only be untangled across 
the elements of a tort claim; its tort version must also be untied from its 
criminal counterpart. 
 
 163. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, § 483. 
 164. In addition to the punitive damages remedy, a defendant’s culpability also affects the 
extent of liability in other instances that depend on a finding of liability in the first instance, such 
as eliminating contributory negligence as a defense in cases of reckless wrongdoing.  See 
HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 16.13.  But the relevance of culpability in the 
prima facie case “is a different one—it concerns the measure of the duty that may be owed in 
varying circumstances, and whether there has been any wrongdoing at all.”  Id. (discussing the 
unitary standard of reasonable care). 
 165. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(c) (3d ed. Oct. 2019 update); 
see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) (“The concept of proximate causation 
is applicable in both criminal law and tort law, and the analysis is parallel in many instances.”). 
 166. LAFAVE supra note 165, § 6.4(f)(2) (stating that a defendant who attacks with “intent to 
kill, but succeeds only in inflicting what would be a non-fatal wound in a person of ordinary 
health,” is guilty of murder, “his act being a direct cause” of the death); id. § 6.4(g)(1) (applying 
the same rule “where the crime was one of recklessness or negligence”). 
 167. Cf. id. § 6.4(c) (recognizing that “on principle” courts need not apply the same rule of 
proximate cause in criminal and tort cases because tort liability turns on the normative question of 
who “should bear the cost,” whereas criminal liability is “generally accompanied by moral 
condemnation”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Due to the ongoing consequences that flow from the imprint of one’s 
behavior on the world, liability would be potentially unlimited if the prima 
facie case only required proof that the defendant’s tortious conduct was a 
factual cause of the plaintiff’s harm.  The requirement of legal cause limits 
the scope of a defendant’s liability, cutting off liability for injuries that were 
factually but not proximately caused by the tortious conduct.  What are the 
policies that justify this limitation of liability? 
Framed at this level of generality, the meaning of proximate cause is 
bound to be confusing.  Throughout the history of modern tort law, 
proximate cause has furthered different policies while being defined by two 
different tests based on foreseeability and directness, each of which has 
been both widely adopted and roundly criticized.  Proximate cause is 
commonly thought to be a “hopeless riddle.”168 
Proximate cause is confusing and prone to controversy because it is 
entwined with all elements of the tort claim, ranging from duty to the 
determination of damages.  The inquiry in this respect is like a prism.  It can 
refract the various facets of a tort claim, creating the appearance that the 
element simultaneously furthers these multiple purposes.  The properties of 
a prism, however, can also work in the other direction, focusing light from a 
range of refracted sources.  Properly applied, the element of proximate 
cause functions in this manner, focusing the more general properties of the 
other tort elements onto the particulars of the case at hand.  
In the prima facie case of negligence liability, proximate cause 
determines whether the more generally defined components of duty and 
breach apply to the specific injury suffered by the plaintiff.  Duty is defined 
in categorical terms, such as risks of foreseeable physical harm.  Based on 
the general class of physical harms governed by the duty, the issue of 
breach—whether the defendant complied with the duty to exercise 
reasonable care—focuses on a more narrowly defined category: the class of 
foreseeable physical harms that would be avoided by the safety precaution 
in question.  The inquiry at this stage is still framed in general terms.  For 
example, reasonably safe driving behavior reduces the risk of a crash for 
nearby drivers, pedestrians, and so on.  A defendant driving in an 
unreasonably safe manner accordingly creates a general field of danger, 
comprised of myriad individuated risks threatening numerous individuals, 
each of whom can be differently situated.  The element of proximate cause 
filters these more generally defined facets of the tort claim to focus on the 
issue of how they apply to the plaintiff’s injuries in the case at hand. 
 
 168. Kelley, supra note 2, at 50. 
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Consequently, proximate cause serves the distinctive role of aligning 
all elements of the tort claim in the prima facie case.  The inquiry ensures 
that the defendant’s breach of duty was a factual cause of an injury 
encompassed within the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, thereby 
establishing the requisite basis for liability in the first instance.  Proximate 
cause aligns the element of duty with the final element of damages, and so a 
duty that is limited to foreseeable harms requires the foreseeability test for 
determining proximate cause. 
Once liability has been established with proof showing that the 
defendant’s breach of duty proximately caused some foreseeable 
compensable harm, the tort inquiry must then determine the amount of 
damages or full extent of the compensable harms caused by the tortious 
conduct.  The compensatory damages award is not fully aligned with all 
other elements of the negligence claim, and that misalignment explains why 
the appropriate test for proximate cause is altered within the damages phase 
of the case. 
The element of duty does not fully align with the element of damages 
in the sense that the two elements do not measure injuries in the same 
manner.  The negligence duty relies on the social value of an injury to 
determine the requirements of reasonable care, whereas the compensatory 
damages remedy is based on the compensable harm actually suffered by the 
plaintiff.169  Due to this misalignment, the duty to exercise reasonable care 
can fully value fatal injuries, even though the loss of life’s pleasures in a 
case of wrongful death is not compensated by the monetary damages 
remedy.170  The social value of other irreparable harms can also be 
considerably higher than the compensatory damages award, creating a 
misalignment between the elements of duty and damages that has important 
implications for the nature of negligence liability.171 
The misalignment that occurs in the damages phase of the case extends 
to the rule of proximate cause.  Although the foreseeability test 
appropriately applies in the prima facie case, it is not a fair method for 
determining the full extent of harm proximately caused by the defendant’s 
tortious conduct.  It would reduce liability for a defendant who caused 
unforeseeably high damages, whereas it could not increase the liability of a 
defendant who caused unforeseeably low damages—the amount of 
compensatory damages is capped by the requirement of actual harm.  
Consequently, the foreseeability test gives the defendant an unfair, one-
 
 169. See Geistfeld, Misalignment, supra note 33, at 159. 
 170. Id. at 159, 162–63, 169. 
 171. See generally id. (demonstrating how the problem of irreparable injury shapes the liability 
rules for accidental harms). 
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sided advantage in determining the extent of damages, a problem more 
fairly solved by the directness test or its substantive equivalent in this phase 
of the case, the eggshell-plaintiff rule.  The particular requirements of the 
compensatory damages remedy, once again, create a misalignment—in this 
instance concerning proximate cause—across other elements of the prima 
facie case. 
For these same reasons, the directness test always applies to 
intentional torts.  The prima facie case for such liability establishes that the 
defendant intentionally caused the plaintiff to suffer some compensable 
harm.  Any discrete or separate inquiry into proximate cause only 
determines damages or the full extent of liability for other injuries factually 
caused by the predicate intentional harm, an inquiry fairly determined by 
the eggshell-plaintiff rule for reasons having nothing to do with the greater 
culpability associated with intentional wrongdoing.  
Although the directness test fairly determines proximate cause for 
intentional torts, it is not appropriate for determining the liability of a 
reckless tortfeasor in the first instance.  Recklessness is a culpable form of 
negligence.  The prima facie case of negligence liability, however, does not 
depend on culpability, and so proximate cause still depends on the 
foreseeability test.  Culpability only becomes relevant after the plaintiff has 
established an entitlement to compensatory damages; it justifies an award of 
extra-compensatory damages to punish the reckless defendant for having 
reprehensibly breached the duty to exercise reasonable care.  The damages 
phase of the case, once again, creates a misalignment between the element 
of duty—for which culpability is irrelevant—and the damages remedy—for 
which culpability can justify a punitive award.  That misalignment fully 
accounts for the culpability of a reckless actor, eliminating that factor from 
the appropriate formulation of proximate cause in the prima facie case. 
Proximate cause implicates a host of issues, illustrating the more 
general point that “one must know the purpose of causal ascription in tort 
law before one can say what causation in that law means.”172  The core 
meaning of proximate cause—its distinctive purpose—can be derived only 
after its roles and associated concepts are untangled across all elements of 
the tort claim. 
 
 172. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 229 (1987).  See generally John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
419 (1979) (arguing that causal determinations necessarily depend on normative or subjective 
considerations). 
